A model of borrower reputation as intangible collateral by Nikolov, Kalin
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A model of borrower reputation as
intangible collateral
Kalin Nikolov
European Central Bank
2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32939/
MPRA Paper No. 32939, posted 22. August 2011 13:40 UTC
A model of borrower reputation as intangible collateral
Kalin Nikolovy
European Central Bank
June 2011
This paper was part of my PhD at the London School of Economics. I would like to thank my supervisors
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, Kosuke Aoki and Alex Michaelides for invaluable help and suggestions on this paper.
I would also like to thank Wouter den Haan, Richard Harrison, Albert Marcet, Bianca de Paoli, Matthias
Paustian, James Proudman, Philippe Weil and Tony Yates for helpful discussions on this paper. All errors
and omissions are mine.
yResearch Department, European Central Bank, Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany. Email:
Kalin.Nikolov@ecb.int
1
Abstract
In this paper, we build a framework which can generate endogenous uctuations in down-
payment requirements. We extend the model of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) by considering an
environment, in which savers can keep their anonymity but borrowers cannot. This allows
lenders to punish defaulting borrowers by excluding them from future borrowing. They
cannot however stop them from saving in the anonymous nancial market. We show how
the possibility of such market exclusion can lead to the emergence of intangible collateral
in equilibrium alongside the tangible collateral which is usually studied in the literature.
Fluctuations in the value of intangible collateral are isomorphic to uctuations in the amount
of borrowing rms can secure against the value of their tangible assets.
We nd that, when we combine the intangible collateral mechanism in our paper with
counter-cyclical variance of idiosyncratic productivity shocks, this helps to generate realistic
negative co-movement of downpayment requirements and aggregate output over the business
cycle. In this case, the presence of intangible collateral increases the amplication of business
cycle uctuations relative to the standard Kiyotaki-Moore (1997) model.
JEL Classication: E21.
Key Words: Collateral constraints, Aggregate uctuations.
1 Introduction
The nancial boom and bust cycle of 2005-2009 was characterised by a substantial increase
and subsequent fall in the permissible leverage for all sectors of the economy. Downpayment
requirements on housing, capital and nancial asset purchases fell during the boom and
then increased sharply as the nancial crisis unfolded during 2008. At the same time, asset
prices and output fell sharply across the world, raising questions about the linkages between
nancial conditions, asset prices and real quantities during the nancial crisis. And while
we have a good theoretical understanding of how credit constraints a¤ect the interaction
between output and asset prices, there has been comparatively less work on downpayment
requirements and other aspects of the nancial conditions facing private borrowers.
In this paper, we build a framework which generates uctuations in downpayment re-
quirements by appealing to changes in the value of borrowers reputation for repayment.
We extend the model of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Kiyotaki (1998) by considering an
environment, in which savers can keep their anonymity but borrowers cannot. This allows
lenders to punish defaulting borrowers by excluding them from future borrowing. They can-
not however stop them from saving in the anonymous nancial market or by engaging in
self-nanced production. We show how the possibility of such market exclusion can lead to
the emergence of intangible collateral in equilibrium alongside the tangible collateral which
is usually studied in the literature.
The intangible collateral is essentially the value of a borrowers reputation for debt re-
payment. We nd that this collateral form can back a very signicant part of the liabilities
of the private sector. One of the key contributions of this paper is to show how the nan-
cial contract in a model with tangible and intangible collateral can still be represented as a
linear borrowing constraint, where a fall in the value of intangible collateral manifests itself
in a higher haircut(or downpayment) while a rise in the value of intangible collateral can
manifest itself as a lower haircut. This result is useful because it substantially reduces the
computational compexity of the model1.
1The borrowing constraint is exactly linear in the steady state or during perfect foresight dynamics. Under
uncertainty and risk aversion, the linearity of the borrowing constraint is only true up to an approximation,
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In our numerical experiments we nd that intangible collateral is large (and haircuts
are low) when the cost to an entrepreneur of being excluded from borrowing is substan-
tial. Intangible (or reputational) collateral has a non-linear relationship with the ability to
collateralise tangible assets. While ine¢ cient rms survive in equilibrium due to the tight
borrowing constraints on e¢ cient producers, expanding the ability to collateralise tangible
assets boosts the excess return of e¢ cient rms and increases the value of access to leverage.
As a result, intangible collateral increases too, further amplifying rmsaccess to credit.
Once the availability of tangible collateral becomes high enough, ine¢ cient production dis-
appears and further increases in tangible collateral starts to push up real interest rates,
depressing the excess rate of return for high productivity entrepreneurs. From this point
onwards, the value of intangible collateral declines until it reaches zero at the point at which
borrowing constraints stop binding.
Finally we solve our model economy with aggregate uncertainty in order to study how
intangible collateral interacts with the business cycle. We nd that the model does generate
endogenous uctuations in haircuts. For conventional technology shocks, these uctuations
are small and pro-cyclical. In other words, the model generates low haircuts in recessions
and high haircuts in booms. The reason for this result is the following. In recessions, asset
prices are low, nancial constraints bind strongly and the excess return for leveraged high-
productivity rms over the unleveraged low-productivity rms increases. Since recessions
are expected to be persistent, this increase in excess returns leads to a rise in the value of
debt market access, reducing lendersrequired haircuts. In contrast, in booms, asset prices
are high, nancial frictions are reduced and the leveraged high productivity entrepreneurs
enjoy a smaller excess return relative to unleveraged low productivity rms. Hence the value
of intangible assets declines, increasing lendersrequred haircuts.
In order to replicate the counter-cyclical behaviour of downpayment requirements in
the data, we augment the model by allowing pro-cyclical uctuations in the technologi-
cal gap between highand lowproductivity rms and also by allowing counter-cyclical
uctuations in the degree of uninsurable idiosyncratic production risk. This introduces a
which is very good unless the degree of risk aversion is very high.
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pro-cyclical component in the value of being a leveraged high productivity producer, helping
to motivate counter-cyclical haircut movements. We nd that counter-cyclical variability in
idiosyncratic investment risk is most promising in terms of generating a negative correlation
between downpayment requirements and aggregate output. The model with counter-cyclical
downpayments also features substantial business cycle amplication.
2 Related Literature
This paper studies the nature of dynamic borrowing contracts in an environment with perma-
nent exclusion from credit markets. There is a large literature on dynamic optimal contracts
starting with the seminal contributions of Kehoe and Levine (1993) who developed the rst
general equilibrium model with endogenous borrowing constraints. Subsequently, work by
Alvarez and and Jermann (2000) showed how the allocation of Kehoe and Levine (1993)
can be decentralised by a set of state contingent borrowing limits in a general economy with
permanent exclusion from risk sharing arrangements.
Our paper is also related to the literature on the collateral amplication literature started
by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Kiyotaki (1998). These papers have shown that when
debts are collateralised, leverage magnies the impact of small shocks on the net worth of
producers, thus amplifying and propagating impulses over time. This mechanism is central
in our paper too. In the standard Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) set up, borrowers can commit
to repay an exogenous fraction of project revenues or tangible asset values. In contrast, this
paper explicitly models the uctuations in such haircutsas a function of the value to a
borrower of being able to access credit markets in future.
There has been relatively little work on the importance of intangible collateral. Hellwig
and Lorenzoni (2007) is a notable exception. They study an endowment economy with lim-
ited commitment in which there is no collateral to secure borrowing. Because the autrarkic
equilibrium is dynamically ine¢ cient and stationary bubbles on intrinsically worthless assets
can exist. Hellwing and Lorenzoni show that when private borrowers can be permanently
excluded from future credit market access, an equilibrium with bubbles on inside liquidity
(private debt) can achieve an idential allocation as the equilibrium with bubbles on outside
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liquidity.
Gertler and Karadi (2010) is closer to this paper in the sense that they model banks
ability to borrow by appealing to the value of excess returns in an equilibrium with no
bubbles. Their mechanism is similar to the intangible collateral studied in this paper. In
Gertler and Karadi (2010) the bank is threatened with bankruptcy and the loss of the
opportunity to enjoy the prots from being a banker. In our model, a defaulting entrepreneur
can immediately set up a new rm and continue producing. However, she loses her access to
future credit, which is costly because she can no longer lever up to maximise the returns from
good business ideas (high productivity spells in the model). Finally, our paper makes the
technical contribution of generalising the dynamic contracting framework to an environment
of risk-averse consumer-producers while still retaining the tractability of the linear borrowing
constraints of the Kiyotaki-Moore (1997) model.
We nd that counter-cyclical variation in idiosyncratic production risk is one mechanism
that is capable of causing counter-cyclical movements in haircuts in a way that amplies the
business cycle. Angeletos and Calvet (2006) and Perez (2006) are two papers that examine
the importance of idiosyncratic production risk for the business cycle. They both show that
the presence of uninsurable idiosyncratic production risk can have a profound impact on
risk-taking and capital accumulation. And if the degree of idiosyncratic production risk
varies in a counter-cyclical fashion (i.e. it is higher in recessions), Angeletos and Calvet
(2006) show that this can amplify the business cycle by a¤ecting entrepreneursinvestment
into risky but high yielding projects. In this paper, our focus is mainly on the impact
of idiosyncratic production uncertainty on haircuts. High ex post productivity variability
causes the expected return from production (in utility terms) to decline and this reduces the
value of borrowing. So to the extent that production uncertainty is high in recessions, this
channel is capable of producing counter-cyclical downpayment requirements.
3 Motivating Observations
There is a lot of evidence that permissible leverage uctuates very substantially for many
private borrowers. Figure 1 below (reprinted from Geannakoplos (2009)) shows how the
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haircuts on securities purchases have uctuated for the Ellington hedge fund. The chart
clearly shows that haircuts average around 20% of the purchase price although they rose to
40% during the Russian default iin 1998 and during the 2008-2009 nancial crisis. During
the 2006-2007 credit boom haircuts were unusually low at levels just above 10%.
Figure 1: CMO margins at Ellington (reprinted from Geannakoplos (2009))
In housing markets, leverage uctuations have also received a lot of recent attention. Figure
2 below shows the movement of the monthly LTV ratio for new home buyers. The chart
shows that the ratio varies in a pro-cyclical fashion, with local peaks in booms (1984, 1988,
1995-1999 and 2007) and troughs in recessions (1975, 1982, 1991, 2003 and 2008).
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Figure 2: Loan to Value Ratios in the US: 1973-2008 (Source: FHFA)
These data show that downpayments in nancial markets move in a counter-cyclical
fashion and the leverage used in security or housing purchase varies in a pro-cyclical fashion.
This is the feature of the data our model aims to explain.
4 The Model
4.1 The Economic Environment
The economy is populated with a continuum of innitely lived entrepreneurs of measure 1.
Each entrepreneur is endowed with a constant returns to scale production function which
uses land and working capital to produce gross output y.
yt = atAt

kt


xt
1  
1 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k is land (which does not depreciate and is xed in aggregate supply) and x is working
capital which fully depreciates.
a is the idiyosyncratic component of productivity which di¤ers between rms both in
terms of its ex ante expected value at the time of investment as well as in its ex post
realised value at the time of actual production. A fraction of rms who we will refer to as
high productivityrms have a high idiosyncratic expected productivity:
Etat+1 = a
H
The other rms have a low expected productivity level (aL  1).
Both types of rms face ex postidiosyncratic risk too. If they are lucky, idiosyncratic
productivity is high
at+1 = a
i +4I
which happens with probability 0.5 and, if they are unlucky, idiosyncratic productivity is
low
at+1 = a
i  4I
which happens with probability 0.5.
The ex ante component of idiosyncratic productivity evolves according to a Markov
process. Following Kiyotaki (1998) let n be the probability that a currently unproductive
rm becomes productive and let  be the probability that a currently productive rm becomes
unproductive. This implies that the steady state ratio of productive to unproductive rms
is n. In our baseline model, we assume that aH , aL and 4I are constant over the business
cycle. A is the aggregate component of productivity (which also can be high AH or low AL).
The aggregate state also evolves according to a persistent Markov process.
In sensitivity analysis, we allow the possibility that the process for idiosyncratic produc-
tivity distribution varies with the aggregate state. First, we examine the possibility that
the expected di¤erence between the expected TFP of high and low productivity rms varies
pro-cyclically over the business cycle. This means that high productivity agents have an
expected TFP in production equal to
Etat+1 = a
H +4E
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during boom periods and aH 4E during recessions. For low productivity rms, aL remains
constant at unity.
Second, we examine a situation in which the ex postidiosyncratic productivity compo-
nent is more volatile during recessions relative to booms. In other words, the value of 4I is
high in recessions and low in booms. This corresponds to a world in which downturns are
periods of higher uncertainty for individual rms compared to booms.
4.2 Entrepreneurs
4.2.1 Preferences
Entrepreneurs are ex-ante identical and have logarithmic utility over consumption streams
U e =
1X
t=0
t ln ct
4.2.2 Flow of Funds
Agents purchase consumption (c), investment goods (x), land (k) at price qt and borrow using
debt securities bt+1 at price R 1t where Xt  (At; t) is a vector describing the aggregate
state of the economy. At is aggregate TFP and  t denotes the wealth distribution.
ct + qtkt+1   bt+1
Rt
= yt + qtkt   bt
We assume incomplete markets for idiosyncratic risk, meaning that Arrow securities contin-
gent on the idiosyncratic state will not trade in equilibrium.
4.2.3 Collateral constraints
Due to moral hazard in the credit market, agents will only honour their promises if it is in
their interests to do so. We assume that an entrepreneur who borrows funds at time t has
the ability to default at t+ 1. Following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) we assume that lenders
can seize the entrepreneurs land holding which has value qt+1kt+1 as well as a fraction 
of the rms revenues yt+1. The entrepreneur keeps the rest of the rms output (1   
fraction). Furthermore, we assume that, upon default, entrepreneurs can be permanently
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excluded from future borrowing. However, they can anonymously lend to other entrepreneurs
or produce without any leverage.
Individuals will repay their debts whenever the value of repaying exceeds the value of
defaulting.. Let V (st; Xt) denote the value of an entrepreneur who has never defaulted and
let V d (st; Xt) denote the value of an entpreneur who has defaulted in the past. st  (wt; ai)
is the idiosyncratic state where wt is individual wealth and ai is the expected idiosyncratic
level of TFP. We focus on a no-default allocation. Following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
and Kiyotaki (1998) we assume that default (or debt renegotiation) can only occur before
the realisation of the aggregate or the idiosyncratic shock at time t + 1. So the borrowing
constraint is cast in terms of expected values:
EtV (st+1; Xt+1jst; Xt) > EtV d (st+1; Xt+1jst; Xt)
At this stage we conjecture that this value function comparison can be reduced to a linear
collateral constraint of the following form.
bt+1 6 Et [tyt+1 + qt+1kt+1]
The value of intangible collateral is equal to the amount of borrowing unbacked by tangible
assets which can be seized by the lender
(t   )Etyt+1
We verify subsequently that this is indeed the case.
4.3 Entrepreneurial behaviour
The entrepreneurs in our economy have to make two types of decisions. They have to choose
consumption over time optimally (the consumption problem) and they have to choose the
(real and nancial) assets they invest in (the portfolio problem). Fortunately, the budget
constraint is linear in all the assets at the entrepreneurs disposal and as a result we can utilise
the result due to Samuelson (1968), which states that we can solve separate the consumption
and portfolio decisions.
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4.3.1 The consumption problem
Due to logarithmic utility, consumption is a xed fraction of wealth at each point in time for
all entrepreneurs regardless of their level of idiosyncratic productivity. This result is proved
in Appendix A and it greatly simplies the aggregation of consumption decisions.
ct = (1  )wt
4.3.2 The production/portfolio problem
Entrepreneurs choose their holdings of three assets (land, capital and debt) under the pres-
ence of a collateral constraint. The rst order conditions for each of the three assets are
given below.
The rst order condition for land is:
 tqt + Et

yt+1
kt+1
+ qt+1

t+1 + tEt

t
yt+1
kt+1
+ qt+1

= 0 (1)
where t = 1=ct is the lagrange multiplier on the ow of funds constraint while t is the
lagrange multiplier on the collateral constraint. The rst order condition for working capital
investment is:
 t + Et


(1  ) yt+1
xt+1
t+1 + t
(1  ) yt+1
xt+1
t

= 0 (2)
Finally the rst order condition for debt holdings is:
  t
Rt
+ Ett+1 + t = 0 (3)
Combining (1), (2) and (3) we get an expression for the optimal mix between land and
working capital:
kt+1
xt+1
=

1  
1
uit
; i = L;H (4)
uHt = qt  
Etqt+1
Rt
  Et
 
(qt+1   Etqt+1) 
H
t+1
t
!
(5)
is the user cost of land for high productivity entrepreneurs for whom borrowing constraints
bind and t > 0.
uLt = qt   Et
 
qt+1
Lt+1
t
!
(6)
is the user cost of land for low productivity entrepreneurs who are unconstrained.
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4.4 Borrowing limit determination
Our economy is a limited commitment one. Borrowers repay their debts only if it is in their
interests to do so. Upon default, a borrower loses his tangible assets but also he loses his
reputation for repayment. This results in permanent exclusion from debt markets in future.
As we now show, entrepreneurs will be allowed to borrow up to the value of the tangible and
intangible assets they can lose when they default.
4.4.1 The value of a non-defaulting entrepreneur
Let V (st; Xt) be the value of a non-defaulting entrepreneur with idiosyncratic state st when
the aggregate state is Xt.
V (st; Xt) = max
ct;kt+1;xt+1;bt+1
fln ct + EtV (st+1; Xt+1)g
In Appendix B we show that the value function takes the following form
V (st; Xt) = ' (st; Xt) +
lnwt
1  
where the intercept ' (st; Xt) satises a functional equation:
' (st; Xt) = ln (1  ) + max
kt+1;xt+1;bt+1
Et

ln 
1   +
ln rit+1
1   + ' (st+1; Xt+1)

(7)
Intuitively, the value of an entrepreneur depends on his current wealth (this is the term
in lnwt) as well as the rate of return the entrepreneur can earn on his wealth (this is the
intercept term). Looking at (7) we can see that, if the rate of return on wealth is equal to
the inverse of the rate of time preference at all times (ri = 1=), the intercept ' (st; Xt) will
be equal to zero and the value of an entrepreneur will be solely determined by his current
wealth. In contrast, values of ri above 1= would generate a positive value of ' reecting
the net present value of excess returnsto the entrepreneur.
4.4.2 The value of a defaulting entrepreneur
An entrepreneur who defaults experiences a large one-o¤ wealth gain because she avoids
paying some of her debt. The cost of this is that she then loses her right to borrow in future.
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We guess that the value of an entrepreneur who has defaulted in the past is given as follows:
V d (st; Xt) = '
d (st; Xt) +
lnwt
1  
where the intercept of the value function satises the now familiar functional equation:
'd (st; Xt) = ln (1  ) + max
kt+1;xt+1;bt+1
Et

ln  + ln rdit+1
1   + '
d (st+1; Xt+1)

This guess is veried in Appendix B. Intuitively, once the entrepreneur defaults he can only
lend to others (when unproductive) or produce without leverage (when productive). This
is reected in the above value function which depends on rdit+1 - the rate of return on the
portfolio of an entrepreneur who has defaulted in the past.
Consider the value of an entrepreneur who defaults at time t + 1. If state (st+1; Xt+1)
realises following her decision to default is, the entrepreneurs value will be given by this now
familiar expession which combines current wealth with the value of future excess returns on
wealth.
V d (st+1; Xt+1) = '
d (st+1; Xt+1) +
lnwdt+1
1  
= 'd (st+1; Xt+1) +
ln [(1  ) yt+1]
1  
The wealth of a defaulting entrepreneur is the 1   fraction of output she gets to keep post
default. This is higher than the wealth she would have had under repayment, because the
defaulting entrepreneur gains wealth equal to (t   ) yt+1 by avoiding repayments on the
debt secured by intangible collateral.
4.4.3 Solving for the borrowing limits
Alvarez and Jermann (2000) solve for borrowing limits which are not too tight as the
highest possible borrowing limit consistent with repayment. In our setting this is given by
the incentive compatibility constraint which equates the expected value of repayment with
the expected value of defaulting.
EtV (st+1; Xt+1j) = EtV d
 
sdt+1; Xt+1

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This implies that the expected loss of reputation due to default (LHS of the expression
below) exactly o¤sets the one-o¤ gain from having ones debt written o¤ (the RHS of the
expression below).
(1  )Et
"X
t+1
 (st+1jst)
 
' (st+1; Xt+1j)  'd (st+1; Xt+1)
#
> Et ln [(1  ) yt+1]  Et ln [yt+1 + qt+1kt+1   bt+1]
Using the approximation:
E lnx  lnEx  1
2
var(lnx)
we get:
(1  )Et
"X
t+1
 (st+1jst)
 
' (st+1; Xt+1j)  'd (st+1; Xt+1)
#  
t
> lnEt [(1  ) yt+1]  lnEt [yt+1 + qt+1kt+1   bt+1]
where

t =
1
2
fvart(ln [yt+1 + qt+1kt+1   bt+1])  vart(ln [(1  ) yt+1])g
is an approximate risk premium term which reects the greater ex post wealth variability
for repaying entrepreneurs. Re-arranging we have:
bt+1 6

 (st+1; Xt+1j) +   1
 (st+1; Xt+1j)

yt+1 + qt+1kt+1 (8)
where
 (st+1; Xt+1j)  exp
(
(1  )
"X
t+1
 (st+1jst)
 
' (st+1; Xt+1j)  'd (st+1; Xt+1)
#  
t)
Solving for the borrowing constraints requires us to solve for the value function and for the
borrowing constraints until both have converged. See Appendix B for further details on the
computational procedure.
4.4.4 Discussion
The entrepreneurs borrowing limit is determined by the trade o¤ between the benets of
gaining some current wealth by defaulting against the costs of permanently losing the ability
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to borrow. The benet from defaulting is determined by the size of unsecured borrowing
- (tyt+1   ). The costs are dominated by the gap between the expected value of being a
non-defaulting entrepreneur (
P
at+1
 (st+1jst)' (st+1; Xt+1jt)) and the value of defaulting
(
P
at+1
 (st+1jst)'d (st+1; Xt+1)). This gap is driven by the utility value of the entrepreneurs
stream of excess returns relative to current nancial wealth.
Because most of these excess returns are in the future, the discount factor is one of
the main determinants of the value of repayment. A discount factor of 0.95 implies that
the entrepreneur is indi¤erent between a 1pp increase in his rate of return on wealth in
perpetuity and a 19% increase in his current nancial wealth. With a discount factor of 0.9,
the consumer is only willing to accept a 9.5% increase in current wealth in exchange for a
1pp increase in returns.
The other crucial determinant of the size of intangible collateral is the probability of
remaining highly productive. If this probability is high, then debt access is valuable because
a borrower is likely to remain productive for some time and would like therefore to keep
borrowing in order to boost his return on wealth. In an environment with persistent invest-
ment opportunities, intangible collateral is high and entrepreneurs have a higher borrowing
capacity than the value of their tangible assets alone.
4.5 Market clearing
There are three market clearing conditions in our model economy - the debt market, the
land market and the goods market. Z
bit+1di = 0 (9)Z
kit+1di = 1 (10)
The total quantity of land in the economy is xed and is normalised to unity.Z
citdi+
Z
xit+1di =
Z
yitdi (11)
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4.6 Behaviour of the aggregate economy
Due to the presence of binding borrowing constraints, high and low productivity entrepre-
neurs have di¤erent demands for assets at a given level of wealth. High productivity agents
prefer to invest in production in order to take advantage of high productivity. Low produc-
tivity agents have a more balanced portfolio - they invest in production too but also lend
funds to the high productivity entrepreneurs through the debt market. This implies that
the wealth distribution does matter for equilibrium. But even though the individual deci-
sion rules di¤er according to idiosyncratic productivity, these decision rules remain linear in
wealth which means that a within-groups aggregation result obtains. The economy behaves
as if it is populated by two agents (a high productivity and a low productivity one). Fol-
lowing Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), we can concentrate on just two moments of the wealth
distribution - the mean of the wealth distribution Wt and the share of wealth owned by
high-productivity agents dt.
At any given date, the state of the aggregate economy can be summarised by the state
vector
Xt = fAt;Wt; dtg
consisting of the level of aggregate productivity, the level of aggregate wealth and the share
of aggregate wealth held by productive agents. At evolves according to an exogenous two
state Markov process while the evolution of the two state variables Wt and dt is governed by
the following relations.
Wt+1 = 

dtR
H
t+1 + (1  dt)RLt+1

Wt (12)
dt+1 =
(1  )dtRHt+1 + n (1  dt)RLt+1
dtRHt+1 + (1  dt)RLt+1
(13)
where Rt+1 and rt+1 are the rates of return on wealth of, respectively, high productivity and
low productivity agents.
In equilibrium, productive agentswealth grows at state contingent rate which depends
on their leverage choices
RHt+1 =

at+1At+1   taHEtAt+1
  
uHt
1 
+ qt+1   Etqt+1
qt +
(1 )

uHt   Et

qt+1 + taHAt+1 (uHt )
1 
=Rt
(14)
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where uHt is the user cost of capital for high productivity agents.
Unproductive agents are unconstrained and invest in their own projects as well as in the
loans they make to the productive agents. This means that the wealth of low-productivity
entrepreneurs grow at the following rate:
RLt+1 =
WLt+1
WLt
(15)
=
Y Lt+1 + qt+1 (1 Kt+1) +Bt+1
XLt+1 + qt (1 Kt+1) +Bt+1
where WLt and Y
L
t , and 1   Kt are, respectively, the aggregate wealth, output, and land
investments of low productivity workers.
Aggregating the land demands of individual high productivity entrepreneurs yields an
expression for the aggregate land purchases by productive entrepreneurs as a function of the
state of the economy:
Kt+1 =
dtWt
qt +
(1 )

uHt   Et
 
qt+1 + tY Ht+1

=Rt
(16)
Due to log utility, individual and aggregate consumption are linear in individual and
aggregate wealth. Hence goods market clearing implies:
(1  )Wt +XHt+1 +XLt+1 = Y Ht + Y Lt
4.7 Competitive equilibrium
Recursive competitive equilibrium of our model economy is a price system uHt , u
L
t , qt, Rt,
household decision rules kit+1, xt+1, b
i
t+1 and c
i
t, i = H;L and equilibrium laws of motion for
the endogenous state variables (12) and (12) such that
(i) The decision rules kit+1, x
i
t+1, b
i
t+1 and c
i
t, i = H;L solve the household decision
problem conditional upon the price system uHt , u
L
t , qt, Rt.
(ii) The process governing the transition of the aggregate productivity and the household
decision rules kit+1, x
i
t+1 and c
i
t, i = H;L induce a transition process for the aggregate state
s given by (12) and (13).
(iii) All markets clear
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5 Calibration
We calibrate our model economy as follows. We set , the share of land in output, equal
to 0.2 in line with the calibration in Davis and Heathcote (2004) of the share of land in
GDP. For the baseline calibration, I set , the percentage of output that can be seized in the
event of default, to zero. So any collateralisability of output in the steady state is due to the
value of intangible collateral. I also set 4I , the standard deviation of ex postidiosyncratic
productivity shocks, and4E, the standard deviation of the excess productivity shockequal
to zero in the baseline calibration.
Calibrating the cross-sectional dispersion of TFP is important because the quantitative
importance of the pecuniary externality studied in our paper is related to the productivity
gap between high and low productivity rms. Bernard et al. (2003) report an enormous
cross-sectional variance of plant level value added per worker using data from the 1992 US
Census of Manufactures. The standard deviation of the log of value added per worker is
0.75 in the data while their model is able to account for only around half this number. The
authors argue that imperfect competition and data measurement issues can account for much
of this discrepancy between model and data. In addition, the study assumes xed labour
share across plants so any departures from this assumption would lead to more variations in
the measured dispersion of labour productivity.
In a comprehensive review article on the literature on cross-sectional productivity dif-
ferences, Syverson (2009) documents that the top decile of rms has a level of TFP which
is almost twice as high as the bottom decile. He nds that unobserved inputs such as the
human capital of the labour force, the quality of management and plant level learning by
doingcan account for much of the observed cross-sectional variation in TFP.
This model does not have intangible assets of the sort discussed in Syverson (2011) and
consequently calibrating the model using the enormous productivity di¤erentials identied
in the productivity literature would overestimate the true degree of TFP di¤erences. In
addition, the Kiyotaki-Moore model would need very tight borrowing constraints or a very
small number of high productivity entrepreneurs in order for credit constraints to be binding
if some rms are so much more productive than others. And within the framework we have,
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binding credit constraints are the only mechanism for generating cross-sectional di¤erences in
productivity. Aoki et al. (2009) also consider these issues in their calibration of a small open
economy version of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). They argue that a ratio of the productivities
of the two groups of 1:15 is broadly consistent with the empirical evidence and I choose this
number for the baseline case.
The discount factor , the probability that a highly productive entrepreneur switches to
low productivity , and the ratio of high to low productivity entrepreneurs n are parameters
I pick in order to match three calibration targets - the ratio of tangible assets to GDP,
aggregate leverage and the leverage of the most indebted decile of rms.
I use data on tangible assets and GDP from the BEA National Accounts in the 1952-2008
period. The concept of tangible assets includes Business and Household Equipment and
Software, Inventories, Business and Household Structures and Consumer Durables. GDP
excludes government value added so it is a private sector output measure.
Aggregate leverage is dened as the average ratio of the value of the debt liabilities of the
non-nancial corporate sector to the total value of assets. Leverage measures can be obtained
from a number of sources. In the US Flow of Funds, aggregate leverage is approximately
equal to 0:5 for the 1948-2008 period. This is broadly consistent with the ndings of Covas
and den Haan (2011) who calculate an average leverage ratio of 0:587 in Compustat data
from 1971 to 2004. Covas and Den Haan (2011) also examine the leverage of large rms and
nd that it is slightly higher than the average in the Compustat data set. Firms in the top
5% in terms of size have leverage of around 0.6. Covas and Den Haan (2007) have similar
ndings in a panel of Canadian rms. There the top 5% of rms have leverage of 0.7-0.75
compared to an average of 0.66 for the whole sample. High productivity entrepreneurs in our
economy run larger rms so di¤erences in productivity and therefore leverage could be one
reason for the ndings of Covas and Den Haan (2007 and 2011). But the perfect correlation
of rm size and leverage that holds in our model will not hold in the data. So if we are
interested in the distribution of rm leverage, the numbers in Covas and Den Haan will be
an underestimate. This is why we pick a target for the average leverage of the top 10% most
indebted rms to be equal to 0:75. This number is broadly consistent with the ndings in
Covas and Den Haan.
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Finally, the high (low) realisations of the aggregate TFP shock (4A) are picked to to
ensure that standard deviation of annual GDP in the model matches that of HP-ltered
annual US GDP. (2.01% in our data sample). The probability that the economy remains in
the same aggregate state it is today is equal to 0:8. Table 1 below displays a summary of
the baseline calibration.
Table 1: Baseline calibration
Parameter Name Parameter Value
 0.921
 0.344
n 0.066
 0.20
pHH 0.80
pLL 0.80
4A 0.003
4E 0.00
4I 0.00
 0.00
aH=aL 1.15
6 Numerical Results for the Baseline Economy
6.1 Steady state comparative statics
In this section we consider how the steady state value of intangible collateral varies with
di¤erent features of the economys production technology and nature of contract enforcement.
Figure 3 below shows the value of intangible collateral as a percentage of output. We compute
the value of intangible collateral as the size of rmsdebts which are not secured by tangible
collateral, expressed as a percentage of steady state output. The three lines on the chart
correspond to three di¤erent values of aH=aL - the ex ante productivity di¤erential between
high and low productivity entrepreneurs. In the absence of any long term punishments for
defaulters, all three lines on the gure should be zero - the downpayment should be exactly
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pinned down by the collateralisability of the rms capital and output. But in our framework
borrowing capacity is determined by the values of a borrowers reputation for repayment as
well as by the value of tangible assets.
Figure 3: Intangible collateral as % of output
We can see from the gure that intangible collateral rst increases with  before declining
once a critical level of  is reached. The gure also shows that when the amount of tangible
collateral is low, a higher ex ante productivity di¤erential aH=aL is associated with more
intangible collateral in equilibrium.
Figure 4 below examines the determinants of the value of a borrowers reputation. The
evolution of reputational collateral in response to changes in  is governed by the interplay
of the impact of rising land prices and falling real interest rates on the leveraged rate of
retun on wealth for high productivity entrepreneurs. While the economy is productively
ine¢ cient (K < 1), rising  increases the price of land and this depresses the rate of return
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on production for low productivity entrepreneurs. Because low productivity savers need to
be indi¤erent on the margin between making loans and producing using their own technology,
the lower rate of return on low productivity projects also pushes down on the risk-free real
interest rate.
Rising capital prices and falling real interest rates increase the leverage available to high
productivity entrepreneurs, boosting the excess rate of return during high productivity spells.
This in turn makes access to borrowing more attractive, driving up intangible collateral
values higher and helping to increase leverage and capital prices even more. Here there is
something of a multiplier e¤ect. Higher leverage boosts excess returns and increases the
value of intangible collateral, thereby securing further increases in excess returns. What
caps the increase in corporate leverage is the growing immediate benet from default which
comes with a high quantity of borrowing which is not secured by tangible assets (land or
pledgable future production).
The reason for the non-linearity in the relationship between tangible and intangible col-
lateral arises due to the fact that once  becomes high enough, high productivity entrepre-
neurs have enough nancing capacity to purchase the entire land stock and low productivity
rms stop producing. At this point, the economy achieves productive e¢ ciency even though
borrowing constraints still bind. Once the economy becomes productively e¢ cient, further
increases in  boost demand for credit by more than they increase the supply of savings.
This starts to bid up the real interest rate and reduces high productivity rmsexcess return
on wealth in the process. Lower excess returns, in turn, errode the value of reputational
collateral. The value of the reputation for repayment reaches zero at the point at which
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borrowing constraints stop binding and the excess return disappears.
Figure 4: Excess return for high productivity entrepreneurs
Figures 3 and 4 also show that the value of repayment increases as the productivity
di¤erential aH=aL rises. The bigger the productivity advantage the greater the benet of
leverage and therefore the greater the leverage a borrower can obtain by mortgaging his
tangible assets and reputation for repayment.
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6.2 Numerical results for the stochastic economy
6.2.1 The cyclical behaviour of debt limits in the model
Table 4 below shows how debt limits evolve over the business cycle for di¤erent parame-
terisations of the economy2. To produce the numbers in the table, we simulated the model
economy and computed the average realisation of t (the collateralisability of output) in
booms and in recessions. Since we keep the value of  (the ability to pledge future output
by means of tangible collateral) xed over the business cycle, any changes in the value of t
over the business cycle is due to uctuations in intangible (reputational) collateral.
In the baseline case (the rst column of the table) we can see that the debt limits t are
very slightly counter-cyclical. They tend to be lower in booms than in recessions though
the di¤erence is very small. The reason for this is that the net worth of high productivity
entrepreneurs is low in recessions and this lowers asset prices. Low current asset prices
implies higher rates of return on investment, and this is magnied by the availability of
leverage. Access to debt markets is more benecial in recessions in our economy because
asset prices are low and the potential prots from leveraged investments are high.
Table 4: Borrowing limits over the economic cycle in the baseline economy
Baseline MI= 0:100 MI= 0:200 ME= 0:003
average  in booms 0:2699 0:2715 0:2777 0:2714
average  in recessions 0:2670 0:2683 0:2632 0:2693
Note: average  downpayment from a 10000 period long simulation
In columns 2-4 of Table 4 we consider a number of modications of the basic environ-
ment in order to study their implications for the cyclical behaviour of intangible collateral.
In columns 2 and 3 of the table, we show results from our model under the assumption that
rms face a high degree of idiosyncratic production risk in recessions (MI= 0:1 in column
2 and MI= 0:2 in column 3) but idiosyncratic risk is zero in booms. The results show that
counter-cyclical idiosyncratic production risk is capable of generating pro-cyclical borrow-
ing limits. This is because uninsurabable idiosyncratic risk reduces the ex ante value (in
2In each case, we re-calibrated the model to hit the targets in Table 1. Appendix D displays the calibrated
parameters for each of these di¤erent parameterisations of our economy.
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terms of utility) of leveraged investments in productive projects. As the value of leveraged
investment falls, so does the value of an entrepreneurs reputation for repayment and this
makes entrepreneurs less able to pledge it as collateral and borrow against its value in the
capital market. As idiosyncratic uncertainty in the recession increases, the average value
of reputational collateral falls and the gap between haircuts in the boom and the recession
increases. This makes the value of intangible collateral pro-cyclical.
In column 4 of the table, we add pro-cyclical movements to the TFP di¤erential between
high and low productivity rms. This modication makes the value of  pro-cyclical too.
The bigger the productivity advantage of leveraged producers, the larger the value of taking
high leverage in order to exploit this productivity advantage. Consequently, the value of
intangible collateral increases too.
6.2.2 Intangible collateral amplication
In the previous subsection we demonstrated that the model is capable of generating move-
ments in rms borrowing limits over the business cycle. Our simulations showed that,
under some parameter values (e.g. the baseline calibration), the model delivers counter-
cyclical movements in  which should dampen the operation of the conventional collateral
amplication mechanism which works via the e¤ect of the price of land on rmsability to
borrow. Under other parameter values (e.g. substantial idiosyncratic investment risk in re-
cessions), the intangible collateral mechanism generates amplication because of the positive
correlation in the value of tangible and intangible collateral.
In this subsection we demonstrate the quantitative impact of the intangible collateral
mechanism on the volatility of output and land prices. To do this, we compare the behaviour
of the model with uctuating intangible collateral with that of a model in which rmsability
to borrow against future output is constant over the business cycle at the same average value
as in the intangible collateral model. In other words, we x average leverage and examine
the role of  volatility on the second moments of output and asset prices. The results of this
exercise are presented in Table 5 below.
26
Table 5: Output and asset price volatility
Baseline MI= 0:100 MI= 0:200 ME= 0:003
Intangible collateral
y = 2:01
q = 2:38
y = 2:01
q = 2:25
y = 2:01
q = 1:90
y = 2:01
q = 2:62
No intangible collateral
y = 2:02
q = 2:39
y = 1:83
q = 1:99
y = 1:31
q = 0:95
y = 1:93
q = 2:51
Note: y is the standard deviation of output and q is the standard deviation of the land
price. All numbers are produced from a 10000 period long simulation.
Two features of the results stand out. In the baseline, the intangible collateral mecha-
nism has a very mild dampening e¤ect on the business cycle. This is because tangible and
intangible collateral are negatively correlated in response to aggregate technology shocks. In
downturns, when the value of land is low, excess returns are high and this boosts the value
of intangible collateral. Entrepreneurs can therefore to some extent substitute intangible for
tangible collateral, which helps to moderate uctuations in their credit access. This dampens
the business cycle.
Once we add counter-cyclical idiosyncratic investment risk (MI> 0 in recessions), the
intangible collateral mechanism delivers amplication. Under this assumption, rms face a
high degree of uninsurable investment risk in recessions. This investment risk hurts mainly
highly leveraged borrowers whose returns are very sensitive to the output from their produc-
tive projects. Therefore, in recessions, idiosyncratic investment risk diminishes the value of
being highly leveraged and consequently the intangible collateral falls too. This correlates
positively with the falling value of tangible collateral in recessions, thereby delivering the
amplication e¤ect we see in the second and third columns of Table 5. The standard devia-
tion of output in the intangible collateral model is 10% higher relative to the model without
intangible collateral when MI= 0:1 and almost 50% higher when MI= 0:2. The volatility
of the land price is also boosted by the intangible collateral channel. When MI= 0:2 the
standard deviation of the land price is double in the intangible collateral model relative to
the framework with tangible collateral only.
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7 Conclusions
This paper extends the collateral amplication framework of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
and Kiyotaki (1998) by adding intangible collateral. Intangible collateral arises due an
assumption that although lending can be done anonymously in this economy, borrowing
cannot. Consequently, a defaulting entrepreneur not only loses a fraction of her tangible
assets but also permanently loses her ability to borrow. When credit constraints bind,
leveraged high productivity entrepreneurs have a rate of return on investments which exceeds
the market interest rate. Leveraged production can boost low productivity agentsrate of
return on wealth and consequently exclusion from debt markets is costly to borrowers. This
generates a value for intangible collateral - in our model this is a borrowers reputation for
repayment.
We study the way such intangible collateral varies with the nature of technology and
contract enforcement in the economy both in steady state and over the business cycle. Steady
state intangible collateral is higher the larger the excess return of leveraged production
relative to saving. This is the case when the productivity di¤erential between the high and
low e¢ ciency technology is large and when the collateralisability of tangible assets is high.
When we introduce aggregate uncertainty we nd that the baseline model predicts that
intangible collateral is mildly counter-cyclical. This is because credit constraints are tighter
in recessions and the excess return of leveraged high productivity entrepreneurs is higher,
increasing the value of intangible collateral. We nd that the realistic addition of counter-
cyclical variability of ex post idiosyncratic productivity shocks helps to introduce pro-
cyclical movements in the value of intangible collateral. The amplication of the Kiyotaki-
Moore framework is substantially increased by adding intangible collateral with counter-
cyclical idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
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9 Appendix A: Optimal consumption
Suppose the entrepreneur has optimally chosen her investments in land, goods investment
and debt securities. This means that she can earn a state contingent rate of return on
invested wealth of R (ait; Xt+1) where a
i
t is the ex ante idiosyncratic TFP component of the
agent. The rst order condition for optimal consumption becomes:
1
ct
= 
X
Xt+1
X
at+1
 (Xt+1jXt)  (at+1jat)R
 
ait; Xt+1
 1
c (at+1;Xt+1)
We guess that the entrepreneur consumes a xed fraction of her available resources:
ct = (1  ) zt
This means that
zt+1 = R
 
ait; Xt+1

zt
Substituting into the consumption Euler equation we have:
1
(1  ) zt = 
X
Xt+1
X
at+1
 (Xt+1jXt)
 
at+1jait

R
 
ait; Xt+1
 1
(1  ) zt+1
= 
X
Xt+1
X
at+1
 (Xt+1jXt)
 
at+1jait

R (st; Xt+1)
1
(1  ) R (ait; Xt+1) zt
=
1
(1  ) zt
This conrms our initial guessed consumption function.
10 Appendix B: Computing value functions
10.1 The value function of a non-defaulting entrepreneur
We now combine the optimal consumption and portfolio choices of entrepreneurs to derive
the value function that characterises their maximum lifetime utility. Let V (ait; Xt) be the
value of a non-defaulting entrepreneur with idiosyncratic state st when the aggregate state
is Xt.
V
 
ait; Xt

= max
ct;kt+1;xt+1;bt+1
8<:ln ct + X
Xt+1
X
at+1
 (Xt+1jXt)
 
at+1jait

V (at+1; Xt+1)
9=;
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We guess a solution of the form:
V
 
ait; Xt

= '
 
ait; Xt

+ &
 
ait; Xt

lnwt
Hence the value function equals:
'
 
ait; Xt

+ &
 
ait; Xt

lnwt (17)
= max
kt+1;xt+1;bt+1
8>>><>>>:
ln (1  ) + lnwt+

P
Xt+1
P
at+1
 (Xt+1jXt)  (at+1jait)
[' (at+1; Xt+1) + & (at+1; Xt+1) lnwt+1]
9>>>=>>>; (18)
= max
kt+1;xt+1;bt+1
8>>><>>>:
ln (1  ) + lnwt+

P
Xt+1
P
at+1
 (Xt+1jXt)  (at+1jait)
[' (at+1; Xt+1) + & (at+1; Xt+1) (ln  + lnR (a
i
t; Xt+1) + lnwt)]
9>>>=>>>;
Equating coe¢ cients we have:
&
 
ait; Xt

= 1 + 
X
Xt+1
X
at+1
 (Xt+1jXt) 
 
at+1jait

& (at+1; Xt+1) (19)
and
'
 
ait; Xt

= ln (1  ) (20)
+ max
kt+1;xt+1;bt+1

X
Xt+1
X
at+1
 (Xt+1jXt)  (at+1jat)
& (at+1; Xt+1)
 
ln  + lnR
 
ait; Xt+1

+ ' (at+1; Xt+1)

Equation (19) implies that
&
 
ait; Xt

=
1
1  
Plugging this into (20) we have
'
 
ait; Xt

= ln (1  ) (21)
+ max
kt+1;xt+1;bt+1

1  
X
Xt+1
X
at+1
 (Xt+1jXt) 
 
at+1jait


ln  + lnR
 
ait; Xt+1

+ (1  )' (at+1; Xt+1)

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10.2 The value function of a defaulting entrepreneur
An entrepreneur who has defaulted in the past is excluded from borrowing. When such
an entrepreneur has low productivity, he has the same portfolio as other low productivity
entrepreneurs with a clean repayment record. This is because low productivity agents do
not use leverage and lend to other agents.
When the defaulting entrepreneur is in a high productivity state, he cannot use leverage
and must self-nance. This implies that he faces a higher user cost of land equal to:
uH;dt = qt   Et
(
qt+1
H;dt+1
t
)
= qt   Et

qt+1
RHt+1

In the absence of borrowing opportunities, the defaulting entrepreneur faces a shadow cost
of funds equal to his own valuation of future wealth in terms of current wealth. This will
tend to be higher compared to those who have some access to debt markets because under
a binding collateral constraint, high productivity agents value future wealth less than the
market relative price.
The high shadow cost of land investments implies that defaulted high productivity en-
trepreneurs will economise on land investments. Because there are decreasing returns to
working capital, such an input mix will earn a lower rate of return on wealth compared to
those entrepreneurs with access to debt markets.
10.3 Value function iterations
Let eR (ai; Xt+1) and eRd (ai; Xt+1) denote, respectively, the rates of return on wealth for non-
defaulting and defaulting entrepreneurs. We are now ready to compute the value functions
by iterating on the functional equation below.
'
 
aH ; Xt

(22)
= ln (1  ) + 
1  
X
 (Xt+1jXt) 
 
at+1jaH

h
ln  + ln eR  aH ; Xt+1+ (1  )' (at+1; Xt+1)i
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'
 
aL; Xt

(23)
= ln (1  ) + 
1  
X
 (Xt+1jXt) 
 
at+1jaL

h
ln  + ln eR  aL; Xt+1+ (1  )' (at+1; Xt+1)i
'd
 
aH ; Xt

(24)
= ln (1  ) + 
1  
X
 (Xt+1jXt) 
 
at+1jaH

h
ln  + lnfRd  aH ; Xt+1+ (1  )'d (at+1; Xt+1)i
'd
 
aL; Xt

(25)
= ln (1  ) + 
1  
X
 (Xt+1jXt) 
 
at+1jaL

h
ln  + lnfRd  aL; Xt+1+ (1  )'d (at+1; Xt+1)i
where eR  aH ; Xt+1 = at+1At+1   taHEtAt+1  uHt 1  + qt+1   Etqt+1
qt +
(1 )

uHt   Et

qt+1 + taHAt+1 (uHt )
1 
=Rt
is the rate of return on wealth for a non-defaulting high-productivity entrepreneur and
eRd  aH ; Xt+1 = at+1At+1

uH;dt
1 
+ qt+1
qt +
(1 )

uH;dt
is the rate of return on wealth for a high-productivity defaulting entrepreneur. The value of
intangible collateral t can be computed from (8).
For given state contingent land price functions, we compute the value functions as well
as the borrowing limit t as follows:
(i) Pick a starting value of t and solve (22) - (25) by value function iteration.
(ii) Update the value of t from (8).
(iii) Return to the value function step (i) above.
(iv) Iterate until value functions and borrowing limits have converged up to a pre-specied
tolerance level.
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11 Appendix C: Computing aggregate equilibrium
From market clearing in the capital and the debt markets we can pin down the state con-
tingent growth rate of the low productivity household without solving an explicit portfolio
problem:
RLt+1 =

at+1At+1
(uLt )
1 

+ qt+1

(1 Kt+1) + Et [tYt+1 + qt+1Kt+1]
qt+1 +
1 

uLt

(1 Kt+1) + Et [tYt+1 + qt+1Kt+1] =Rt
(26)
where
uLt = qt   Et
 
qt+1
Lt+1
Lt
!
= qt   Et

qt+1
RLt+1

High productivity entrepreneurs invest the following fraction of their wealth in land.
Kt+1 =
dtWt
qt +
1 

uHt   Et [tYt+1=Kt+1 + q (Xt+1)]
(27)
Their rate of return is given by:
RHt+1 =
 
at+1At+1   taHEtAt+1
 (uHt )

1 
+ qt+1   Etqt+1
qt +
1 

uHt   Et [tYt+1=Kt+1 + qt+1]
(28)
where the user cost of land is given by
uHt = qt  
Etqt+1
Rt
  Et

qt+1   Etqt+1
RHt+1

The real interest rate on debt securities is given by the consumption euler equation:
Rt = Et
 
Lt+1
Lt
!
= Et

1
RLt+1

Finally, goods market clearing implies that:
(1  )Wt + 1  


uLt (1 Kt+1) + uHt Kt+1

= Wt   qt
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Using a zero-nding routine, solve for the values of

Rt; Kt+1; qt; R
H
t+1; R
L
t+1; u
H
t ; u
L
t ; Kt+1
	
at which these conditions are satised up to an error tolerance level. I use Matlabs own
fsolve.m routine.
3. Use the state evolution equations to compute next periods state vector:
Wt+1 =

dtR
H
t+1 + (1  dt)RLt+1

Wt (29)
dt+1 =
(1  )dtRHt+1 + n (1  dt)RLt+1
dtRHt+1 + (1  dt)RLt+1
(30)
4. Repeat steps (1)-(3) for a large number of periods. Using the simulated data, update
the price and forecasting function coe¢ cients using linear regression.
5. Re-compute a simulated time series of the endogenous variables in our model economy
under the new forecasting rule. Repeat steps (1)-(4) until the coe¢ cients on the forecasting
rule have converged up to an error tolerance level.
12 Appendix D: Parameter values under di¤erent cal-
ibrations
In section 6 we examined the sensitivity of the intangible collateral mechanism to di¤erent
parameterisations of the variability of ex post idiosyncratic TFP shocks (MI) as well as
the variability of the ex anteidiosyncratic TFP shock (ME). Changing MI and MEa¤ects
the behaviour of the model. MEhas a large impact on the volatility of the economy while
MIa¤ects desired leverage.
When changing MI and MEwe recalibrated  (the fraction of output which can be seized
by creditors) and 4A (the variability of the aggregate component of technology) in order
to hit the two moments of the model which were most a¤ected - the standard deviation of
output and average corporate leverage. Table D below shows the values we picked in order
to make sure that each of the model variants we considered matched the target moments.
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Table D: Parameter values under di¤erent calibrations
Parameter Name Baseline MI= 0:100 MI= 0:200 ME= 0:003
 0.000 0.0021 0.0092 0.0002
4A 0.0030 0.0034 0.0042 0.0016
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